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Freedom and equality in 
democracies: Is there a trade-off?
Heiko Giebler
WZB Berlin Social Science Centre, Germany
Wolfgang Merkel
WZB Berlin Social Science Centre and Humboldt-University Berlin, Germany
Abstract
In political philosophy, economic theory and public discourse, there is a seemingly endless debate on what 
the essence of equality and freedom is and what relation between the two is essential to a good political 
order. Views range from the conviction that too much socio-economic equality jeopardises freedom to the 
position that a certain level of equality is necessary for the proper realisation of freedom. Building on these 
conflicting normative claims, we look at data from more than 50 established and emerging democracies 
for a period of more than 20 years to investigate whether there is indeed a trade-off between freedom 
and equality or whether they are mutually reinforcing. In the process, we distinguish between two types of 
equality – political and socio-economic. Our findings suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
freedom and both types of equality – even if we control for the level of economic development.
Keywords
Freedom, political equality, socio-economic equality, trade-off, comparative politics, democracies
There is little disagreement among political philosophers, democratic theorists or empirical 
researchers of democracy that freedom and equality are the two core principles of liberal democ-
racy. What is highly disputed, however, is the meaning of the two democratic principles and the 
proper relation between them that makes for a good political order. Building on centuries of 
political thought, more recent views on this question range from the firm conviction that too 
much socio-economic equality jeopardises political and individual freedom (Nozick, 1974; von 
Hayek, 1944, 1960) to the position that a certain level of socio-economic equality is necessary 
for the proper realisation of freedom (Dworkin, 1981; Phillips, 2004; Rawls, 1971; Sen, 1993). 
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In short, normative conceptions range from a trade-off1 between the two principles to one being 
a necessary condition for the other.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we present the most prominent and relevant perspec-
tives in this debate and draw an ideal typical distinction between a liberal-libertarian and an ‘equal-
itarian’ camp.2 On this basis, we deduce conflicting normative assumptions on the relationship 
between political freedom and two types of equality – political and socio-economic – in democra-
cies. In the second part of the paper, we put these assumptions to an empirical test using a sample 
of more than 50 established and emerging democracies for a period of more than 20 years in order 
to investigate whether there is indeed a trade-off between the two core principles of democracy. 
Our analyses show that – even if we control for economic development – there is a positive asso-
ciation of freedom and political as well as socio-economic equality, contradicting normative 
assumptions in political philosophy of a trade-off between freedom and equality.
Tocqueville’s trade-off between freedom and equality – and its 
opponents
Tocqueville’s book Democracy in America ([1835/40] 1994) is probably the most obvious example 
of a work in democratic theory that identifies a trade-off between freedom and equality. Tocqueville 
links this trade-off directly to democracy and its effects on the two principles and their association: 
‘There is in fact, a manly and lawful passion for equality that incites men to wish all to be powerful 
and honored. […] Not that those nations whose social conditions is democratic naturally despise 
liberty; on the contrary, they have an instinctive love of it. But liberty is not the chief and constant 
object of their desires; equality is their idol’ (Tocqueville, [1835/40] 1994: 53). Tocqueville sees a 
fundamental tension between freedom and equality in general and between majoritarian democ-
racy and individual freedom in particular. The relentless drive towards political and social equality 
in democracies raises the threat of a tyranny of the majority, confronting the people with the choice 
between democratic freedom and democratic tyranny. The problem of America’s democracy, in 
particular, is the unrestricted power of the majority. Too much political equality in politics, society 
and economy weakens the institutional guarantees for individual and minority rights.
Tocqueville’s argument rests on the assumption that individuals have a clear preference for 
equality. The same assumption holds at the macro-level of the political order. Democracy unleashes 
struggles among groups and individuals alike for more equality. It triggers political action for the 
equalisation of power, property and status among citizens at the expense of freedom. Therefore, 
every democratic political order has to institutionalise controls to secure freedom in order to pre-
vent a tyranny of the equality-driven majority.
Rousseau’s work ([1762] 2003) constitutes the antipode to the trade-off argument in classical 
political philosophy. What is relevant for our purposes here is Rousseau’s argument that people can 
only be free if they remain politically equal. Political equality, in turn, can only be achieved if 
social inequality is as little as possible. Men are essentially free and equal in the ‘state of nature’, 
but the progress of civilisation and the inequality arising from private property destroyed both – 
first equality and then freedom. In order to restore the complementarity of freedom and equality, a 
form of direct democracy needs to be established whereby citizens constitute a collective body 
capable of protecting and securing both principles. Here, we also find a clear distinction between 
two types of equality: political equality, in the form of direct democracy incorporating all citizens, 
and socio-economic equality, which is endangered by private property. Socio-economic equality 
later even became the conditio sine qua non for free and equal societies in the writings of Marx and 
other leftist philosophers. Tocqueville, however, followed a different logic in positing a trade-off, 
referring rather to an equality of customs, ambitions and political rights than of socio-economic 
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resources, wealth and income. Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether such an extension becomes 
necessary in the context of modern democracies and of continuously rising levels of socio-eco-
nomic inequality (Piketty, 2014).
Along the continuum between the equalitarian and libertarian poles of trade-off and mutual 
complementarity, there have emerged distinct traditions of thought, if not ideological camps, in 
philosophy, economics and politics that remain present and influential to this day. These develop-
ments were shaped by real-world politics: the limitations on freedom within the communist world 
served for many liberals as empirical proof that collective socio-economic equality suppresses 
individual freedom. Despite considerable differences, libertarian liberals such as Nozick and von 
Hayek, or social liberals, such as Rawls, and Berlin,3 share the common view that it is freedom that 
has to be protected from excessive socio-economic equality in modern societies. On the other 
hand, existing or growing inequalities are seen as fundamental challenges to democracy in the 
works of Crouch (2004), Habermas (1998), Piketty (2014) and Sen (1999).
We do not deny that individual freedom is desirable independently of its positive (or negative) 
relation to equality. We also acknowledge that equalitarians may consider equality of such impor-
tance per se that they would even pay for it, if necessary, with reduced freedom. This ongoing 
normative debate between libertarians and equalitarians cannot be decided – neither here nor prob-
ably anywhere else, for that matter.4 However, what can be done is to test whether the widespread 
‘Tocquevillian fear’ of a trade-off finds empirical support in contemporary democracies – or, alter-
natively, whether there is evidence for a positive association between freedom and equality (as 
argued, for example, by Sen). In other words, it is possible – perhaps even necessary – that both 
principles are realised by one and the same democratic system. Moreover, do these patterns change 
if we distinguish political from socio-economic equality? Especially the latter type of equality is 
deemed by thinkers such as von Hayek, Friedman and Nozick to decrease political freedom. Hence, 
the trade-off might be reformulated to hold that there is a negative relationship between socio-
economic equality and freedom while there is no such – or perhaps even a positive – relationship 
between political equality and freedom.
The empirical analyses in this paper test the following (conflicting) assumptions about the asso-
ciation of freedom and equality as derived from the libertarian and ‘equalitarian’ camps of political 
philosophy:
(1)  There is a trade-off between freedom and equality. Both principles cannot be maximised at 
the same time.
(2)  Freedom and equality possess a mutually reinforcing association. Both principles can be 
maximised at the same time.
The first represents the classical Tocquevillian assumption that still dominates the libertarian tradi-
tion to the present, while the second represents the equalitarian perspective. Von Hayek’s work, 
especially his warning of a road to serfdom (1944), and Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom 
(1962) represent perhaps the most influential works of the libertarian tradition in the 20th century. 
The equalitarian perspective, on the other hand, is grounded to some extent in Rawls’s social-lib-
eral ‘theory of justice’, together with his emphasis on equal political rights, and in Sen’s concept 
of a more equal distribution of individual ‘capabilities’ organised by governmental action. A more 
equal distribution of ‘primary goods’ (Rawls, 1971) or material ‘life chances’ (Sen, 1993, 1999), in 
turn, enables individuals to enjoy positive freedom. However, this perspective points to different 
types of equality5 that might have different associations with political freedom. The perspective 
shifts from the mere existence of formal political rights to the necessary preconditions enabling 
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citizens to make use of these rights.6 The less equally distributed these resources are, the more 
unequally distributed will be the capabilities to participate in politics. One can argue that the latter 
requires more intervention by the state; for example, through the provision of public schools and 
universities, public media outlets, or certain aspects of a social market economy. Such interven-
tions might pose more of a challenge to freedom (e.g. private property) than the provision of politi-
cal equality. Hence, we add a third assumption as a qualification of assumptions 1 and 2:
(3)  The validity of assumptions 1 and 2 depends on the type – political or socio-economic – of 
equality.
Before presenting our data and methodological approach, it is necessary to highlight that we are 
not aiming to identify causal relationships between freedom and equality. While part of the litera-
ture and theories referenced above makes claims about what causes what, we have chosen a more 
modest approach, as can be seen in the way the assumptions are phrased. The contribution of our 
study might best be understood as an ‘identification of patterns’, constituting a first step in testing 
normative claims and bridging the gap between political philosophy and empirical democracy 
research. Our findings are meaningful insofar as they investigate the existence of patterns of rela-
tionships between freedom and equality, using a rigorous methodological approach and nuanced 
measures of the empirical realisation of both principles.
Data and measurement
To test the aforementioned assumptions, we use data from three sources. The Democracy Barometer 
offers information on political freedom and political equality over time for a large number of coun-
tries (Merkel et al., 2014a, 2014b). The database provides a nuanced measurement of democratic 
quality and its sub-dimensions for established and emerging democracies, applying a mid-range 
concept of democracy that goes beyond mere legal or constitutional provisions but also takes into 
account the empirical realisation of democracy (Bühlmann et al., 2012). All in all, more than 100 
indicators are used, thereby reducing problems of reliability. Fortunately, the Democracy Barometer 
not only seeks to ensure congruence between theoretical concept and empirical measurement, but 
also offers – taking up the suggestion of Munck and Verkuilen (2002: 12ff.) – a hierarchy of indica-
tors ranging from the lowest level to the more abstract functions and principles of democracy 
(Merkel et al., 2014a). For our analyses, we use the Democracy Barometer’s measures of freedom 
and equality, which – together with control – constitute the three principles of the quality of democ-
racy as defined by the project (Bühlmann et al., 2012). Each principle, in turn, consists of three 
sub-dimensions called functions (individual liberties, rule of law, and public sphere for freedom, 
and transparency, participation, and representation for equality), which are broken down into com-
ponents, subcomponents and, finally, indicators that are then measured by the Barometer.
The Democracy Barometer’s concept of freedom incorporates property rights and their protec-
tion vis-à-vis the state, in accordance with the Lockean tradition and the particular emphases of the 
neo-liberals von Hayek and Friedman. However, it goes beyond this narrow economic core to 
encompass individual liberties such as physical integrity as well as freedom of religion, opinion, 
information and movement. It also includes the right to organise and form social alliances as well 
as the strength of civil society itself. Equality is conceptualised as political equality in the 
Democracy Barometer – excluding, for example, socio-economic inequalities. The general idea is 
that all citizens must have equal access to political power, de jure and de facto. Citing the project’s 
description: ‘Political equality thus aims at the equal formulation, equal consideration, and equal 
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inclusion of all citizens’ preferences. Inclusive participation, representation, and transparency are 
required to reach this goal’ (Bühlmann et al., 2012: 521f.).
The scales applied in the Democracy Barometer are not fixed, which eliminates problems of 
comparability over time and indistinctiveness at very low or very high levels that are present in 
many other democracy measures (Giebler, 2012). Instead, the project normalises all indicators at 
the lowest level in comparison to extreme values of the most established democracies. As a result, 
a value of 0 represents the lowest standard in an established democracy; a value of 100 represents 
the highest standard.7
In addition, we require a reliable indicator for socio-economic equality. Socio-economic equal-
ity – or socio-economic inequality, for that matter – can be measured in various ways. For this 
paper, we have decided to use the net Gini coefficient (post-transfer and post-tax) as a representa-
tion of income inequalities. Our decision is based, first and foremost, on the need for data that are 
available for as many countries as possible as well as an extended period of time. In addition, there 
is a long tradition of research, both concerning the validity of the measure itself and applying it to 
substantive research questions. However, there is also a long debate regarding the measure’s com-
parability across geographical entities and points in time (Solt, 2009, 2014). Hence, we use the 
Standardised World Income Inequality Database (Solt, 2014), which is not only the most compre-
hensive data source but is also based on a sophisticated procedure for generating comparable data.8 
The procedure does not change the original scale. Hence, the theoretical range of the indicator runs 
from 0 (no net income inequality) to 100 (maximum net income inequality).
Finally, we include a measure of economic development in our stochastic models as a control. 
Thus, we eliminate the possibility that high levels of freedom and/or any relationship between 
freedom and the two types of equality identified in our models are confounded by the positive 
relationship between societal wealth and democratic quality. We have chosen GDP per capita 
measured in constant 2005 US$ as a widely used indicator. The data are taken from the Quality of 
Governance dataset (Teorell et al., 2015), which provides data originally collected by the World 
Bank (2014).
Merging the three data sources, we are left with yearly data on 54 countries for the period 
(mostly) from 1990 to 2012 – all in all, 1141 cases (country years).9 The sample is unbalanced, 
meaning that not all countries have data corresponding to all 23 years. However, the average num-
ber of country years available is high at 21.1, with the lowest being 11 for Peru. We do not expect 
this to be problematic for our analyses. Nevertheless, we take this particularity of our data into 
account whenever possible.
The most limited of our three data sources is the Democracy Barometer, which only covers a 
medium-sized number of countries.10 After initially covering only the 30 most established democ-
racies, the Democracy Barometer expanded its sample by about 40 countries (Merkel et al., 2014c: 
6) – most of them established democracies as well, but also including new, less established democ-
racies. As a result, not all the countries qualify as liberal democracies for the whole period under 
analysis. However, as the project relies on relative and not fixed scales, the Democracy Barometer 
is able to account for such non-democratic episodes. Moreover, our research design (see below) 
provides powerful tools for dealing with the particularities of countries and, by extension, the 
somewhat heterogeneous sample of countries.
Testing the assumptions
What is the empirical relationship between freedom and equality? As a first step, we present in 
Figure 1 the graphical association of freedom (y-axis) and political equality (x-axis). Clearly, the 
figure shows a positive relationship between freedom and equality. High levels of political freedom 
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go hand in hand with political equality and vice versa. Realising both core principles of democracy 
at the same time, then, is not at all impossible. This finding holds for all levels of both principles. 
The pattern is neither more nor less prominent at low values or high values of freedom or 
equality.
We added a dashed line to the figure simply to represent identical values on both axes. The cases 
are more or less equally distributed above and below the line. This indicates that freedom translates 
nearly one-to-one into political equality and vice versa. These findings strengthen normative con-
siderations that freedom and equality have to be considered ‘co-original’ in democracies.
Turning to socio-economic equality, there seems to be a negative relationship between inequal-
ity and freedom (Figure 2). Higher levels of freedom are associated with lower levels of socio-
economic inequality. In other words, we see the same substantive relationship as in Figure 1. The 
distribution of cases runs from the upper left to the lower right simply because high Gini coeffi-
cients represent less equal societies. Again, the evidence points to mutual compatibility, not mutual 
exclusivity. The vast majority of cases are located below the dashed line. In comparison to Figure 
1, higher values of political freedom are necessary to find equally high levels of equality. However, 
this is probably of lesser relevance as the two measures presented in Figure 2 are constructed with 
very different techniques and by very different means.
Considering together the evidence provided by the two figures, we find no support for a trade-
off but strong evidence for a positive association. Hence, assumption 1 has to be rejected in favour 
of assumption 2. At the same time, there is no clear-cut difference based on the type of equality, 
which speaks against the need to differentiate between the two types of equality with respect to 
their association with political freedom.
As a second step, we apply more rigorous testing of the three assumptions beyond eye-balling. 
In fact, the scatter plots presented above might even be misleading due to the hierarchical data 
structure. Hierarchical, in this case, refers to the time-series nature of the underlying data, given 
that we have repeated measurements for each country. The relationship between freedom and the 
Figure 1. Freedom and political equality (N = 1141).
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two equality measures can vary across countries and such a variation may not be reflected in the 
overall association – whether in the plots themselves or in any empirical analysis that does not 
control for the hierarchical data structure.
However, such tests are far from straightforward if the underlying data basically consist of a 
time-series dataset. Mere correlation analysis to test the relationship of any two of the measures is 
insufficient because the calculation is unable to control for the nested structure of the data. 
Moreover, we expect high levels of autocorrelation, meaning that values at t1 are correlated with 
values at t0. In other words, it is highly likely that, for example, a country’s level of political free-
dom in the year 2001 ‘depends’ first and foremost on its level of political freedom in 2000. 
Therefore, correlation analysis, the most prominent approach for testing for non-causal associa-
tion, would overestimate any relationship, in terms of both magnitude and significance levels.
Instead, we estimate two random-effects linear growth models with a correction for first-order 
autocorrelation. This enables us to control for the aforementioned peculiarities of our dataset. Such 
models make it necessary to define a quasi-causal relationship by choosing one of the indicators as 
the dependent variable. For the models in Table 1, we picked freedom as the dependent variable 
and the two measures of equality as independent variables and included a second independent vari-
able to control for time effects. Again, we are not proposing a directional test in terms of causality 
but, rather, chose such a model in order to address other, more relevant data issues. As the libertar-
ian camp proposes a negative effect of equality on freedom, using the latter as the dependent vari-
able makes intuitive sense. The models allow for random-intercepts – level differences of the 
dependent variables across countries – and for a random-coefficient for the effect of freedom on 
the dependent variables. The latter specification accounts for significant country differences 
regarding the relationship between freedom and the two types of equality.11 Taking both types of 
random estimates together, we end up with a very flexible design able to account for – among other 
factors – the various histories, developmental trajectories and levels of democratic quality of the 
countries under study. Finally, we add GDP per capita (in US$100) as a control for the level of 
economic development.
Figure 2. Freedom and socio-economic equality (N = 1141).
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Model 1 shows a significant effect of political equality on political freedom, similar to that 
shown in Figure 1. In general, then, more equality is associated with more freedom, even if a more 
rigorous test is applied. Hence, we can reject the trade-off assumption. However, the random-
coefficient variance estimate σ²u1 is significant as well. This indicates that there is relevant varia-
tion regarding the effect of political equality on freedom across countries. In fact, based on our 
estimation, 95% of the regression coefficients are expected to lie between –0.65 and 1.04. In other 
words, as the distribution of these coefficients follows a standard normal distribution with a mean 
of 0.196, a relevant proportion of estimated coefficients is negative. This means that in some cases, 
more political equality is associated with less political freedom. There is no general trade-off, but 
there are exceptions to this rule. Furthermore, the random intercept (σ²u0) is significant as well. 
Freedom levels between countries differ to a large degree and these differences are independent of 
a country’s level of political equality. Based on the random effects parameters, we find a significant 
and negative correlation between the random intercepts and the random coefficients for political 
equality. In substantive terms, countries showing higher (unexplained) levels of freedom display a 
weaker association of equality with political freedom and vice versa.
Moreover, political freedom decreases significantly over time in Model 1. The effect is rather 
small: freedom decreases by one unit over a five-year period. However, it is worth highlighting that 
such a negative trend exists at all for the period from 1990 to 2012, especially because we are look-
ing at a group of mostly established democracies. On the other hand, economically more developed 
countries show higher levels of freedom; roughly US$2500 result in a one-unit increase of the 
dependent variable.
As Model 2 shows, there is also a positive effect of socio-economic equality on political free-
dom – again, the negative coefficient is a result of the original coding of socio-economic equality; 
a higher Gini coefficient is associated with lower levels of freedom. Regarding the time trend and 
Table 1. Random-effects growth models.
Level 1: N = 1141
Level 2: N = 54
Model 1
(DV: Freedom)
Model 2
(DV: Freedom)
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Fixed-effects parameters  
Political equality 0.196** 0.075  
Socio-economic equality –0.173* 0.086
Time –0.217*** 0.046 –0.180** 0.068
Economic development 0.039*** 0.006 0.050*** 0.006
Intercept 467.5*** 90.90 406.6** 135.2
Random-effects parameters  
σ²u1 (Equality measure) 0.185*** 0.052 0.015 0.041
σ²u0 (Intercept) 419.1*** 117.8 64.72 90.72
covu01 (Equality measure, intercept) –8.040*** 2.373 –0.860 1.729
Autocorrelation (AR 1) 0.842*** 0.036 0.955*** 0.025
σ²e (Within-individual variance) 19.73*** 4.455 76.27 42.92
Notes: ‘Equality measure’ refers to political equality in Model 1 and socio-economic equality in Model 2. All models 
have been estimated with Stata 14’s – mixed – command with the full-maximum likelihood specification, unconstrained 
random-effects, and corrections for autocorrelation.
***= p < 0.001, ** = p <0.01, * = p < 0.05.
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the effect of economic development, we get results very similar to Model 1. However, we find no 
evidence of country differences regarding random intercepts or random coefficients as well as no 
significant correlation between the two. As a result, we have to reject the trade-off assumption for 
the second type of equality as well. Again, the association is one of a mutually reinforcing charac-
ter and, in contrast to Model 1, there is no indication of variation in this association: socio-eco-
nomic equality does not lead to less freedom.12
Taking all these results together, we find only little evidence for a negative association between 
freedom on the one hand and the two types of equality on the other. In general, the trade-off 
assumption can be rejected. However, the association between freedom and socio-economic equal-
ity is somewhat weaker, as indicated by the higher p-value and – to a lesser degree – by the smaller 
coefficient. Moreover, there is greater variation regarding the association of freedom and political 
equality and we encourage scholars to conduct more in-depth analyses that go beyond the scope of 
this short paper.
Conclusion
In contrast to the far from resolved debate within political philosophy, the empirical relationship 
between freedom and equality is rather clear-cut – at least in our analysis of 54 established and 
emerging democracies for the period from 1990 to 2012. Contrary to the traditional libertarian 
fear of a trade-off between freedom and equality, as proposed originally by Tocqueville and radi-
calised over a hundred years later by, for example, von Hayek, we find that the two core princi-
ples of democracy (freedom and equality) possess a mutually reinforcing association, as argued 
most forcefully in the work of Sen. Our empirical findings show a rather robust positive correla-
tion between political freedom and political equality. We also proposed that it might be helpful 
for the debate to distinguish between political and socio-economic inequality; such a distinction, 
however, turns out to have only minor effects on the interpretation of the association. Surprisingly 
and contrarily to the general assumption in more recent research on political participation (e.g. 
Weßels, 2015), we did not find any negative relationship between socio-economic equality on 
the one hand and de jure and de facto freedoms on the other, at least not on the aggregate level. 
This speaks against the simple ‘hydraulic’ suggestion that reducing socio-economic equality will 
automatically lead to higher levels of political equality and freedom or vice versa. Although 
weaker than the association of political equality and freedom, our results suggest a positive asso-
ciation of socio-economic equality and freedom as well. We interpret this as a positive sign: it 
seems that societies and political orders do not have to decide between the two principles but can 
pursue the maximisation of both freedom and equality. This does not mean, of course, that rep-
resentatives of normative theory or real-world politics cannot pursue one over the other. We 
would maintain, however, that any arguments to this end should no longer rest on the claim that 
the two principles are mutually exclusive in modern democracies. Clearly, our results point in a 
different direction.
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Notes
 1. The meaning of ‘trade-off’ in this debate boils down to the assumption that freedom and equality cannot 
be maximised at the same time because increasing one sets limits to or even decreases the other.
 2. It goes without saying that we cannot present any comprehensive overview of or insight into this debate 
here. We use the two terms ‘libertarian’ and ‘equalitarian’ to designate, in ideal-typical fashion, the two 
normative endpoints on the continuum between freedom and equality. Moreover, we use the term ‘equal-
itarian’ for the sake of distinctiveness and of better fit to the concept of equality. This does not mean that 
we challenge, for example, the classification of Rawls or Sen as liberal thinkers. However, they and some 
others assigned to the ‘equalitarian’ camp clearly highlight the relevance of equality for the success of 
liberal democracy (Rawls: ‘equality of primary goods’; Sen: ‘equality of capabilities’) which stands in 
contrast to more radical liberals’ (i.e. libertarians’) emphasis on the overarching importance of freedom.
 3. Berlin (and later Sen) distinguishes between two concepts of freedom: negative and positive. Freedom 
in the negative sense means being free from the interference of third parties; positive freedom means a 
person is free to the extent she can determine her own life without being dependent on others (Berlin, 
1969: 122). In the empirical part we will focus on negative freedom alone, because positive freedom 
overlaps too much with socio-economic equality and because appropriate and reliable data exist only for 
negative freedom.
 4. For a more in-depth discussion of the validity of the normative claims of both camps that links freedom 
and equality to the concept of self-ownership, see Cohen (1995: ch. 4).
 5. Tocqueville does not make a conceptual distinction between socio-economic and political equality.
 6. This is developed more cautiously by Rawls in ‘A Theory of Justice’ than by Sen, but is nevertheless 
visible in his second principle of justice (Rawls, 1971: 302).
 7. Values below 0 or above 100 are possible but not present in the underlying sample. A detailed overview 
of the theoretical concept, the indicators, and the measurement can be found in several publications 
(Bühlmann et al., 2012; Merkel et al., 2014a, 2014c).
 8. Again, we refer to the original author of the data for further information (Solt, 2014). Note that we do not 
use the multiple imputations provided in the original dataset but limit our analyses to the mere mean of 
these values for each country year (for a similar strategy, see Banducci et al., 2015). With a very small 
number of exceptions, the variance of the imputed values for each country year is low. The mean stand-
ard deviation equals 0.80, which is very modest in relation to the empirical range of the Gini coefficient 
that runs from 18 to 62.6.
 9. Our sample includes the following countries: Argentina (1990–2006), Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria (1991–2012), Canada (1990–2011), Chile (1990–2011), Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia 
(2001–2012), Cyprus, Czech Republic (1993–2012), Denmark, Dominican Republic (1996–2012), El 
Salvador, Estonia (1993–2012), Finland, France, Germany (1991–2012), Greece, Hungary, Iceland 
(1992–2012), India (1990–2010), Ireland, Israel (1990–2011), Italy, Japan (1990–2010), Latvia (1992–
2012), Lithuania (1992–2012), Luxembourg, Malta (2000–2012), Mexico (1998–2012), Moldova (1995–
2012), Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru (2002–2012), Poland, Portugal, Romania (1996–2012), 
Slovakia (1993–2012), Slovenia (1991–2012), South Africa (1990–2011), Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand (1993–2011), Turkey, Ukraine (1994–2012), United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. If not specified otherwise, data are available for all years between 1990 and 2012.
10. Moreover, the dataset does not provide values for freedom and equality for all countries in the sample, as 
missing values make it impossible to calculate the respective values. Therefore, we have selected from 
the whole Democracy Barometer sample those 54 democracies for which we have full data available. 
Nevertheless, the Democracy Barometer is the only democracy index that is highly sensitive to country 
variations (in contrast to Polity IV and Freedom House) and indeed measures freedom and political 
equality in a way that is compatible with our conceptualisation of freedom and equality.
11. Growth curve models enable scholars to estimate more complicated time effects than the overall linear 
growth as specified in our models. However, and possibly due to the necessary correction for auto-
correlation, likelihood-ratio tests do not support the inclusion of any additional time-related random 
coefficients.
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12. There is a second relevant difference between the two models. As we do not aim to test a causal rela-
tionship, but rather mere associations, we also run two additional models. If we change the dependent 
variables – using freedom to predict political and socio-economic equality – we get very similar patterns 
for the model on political equality. For socio-economic equality, however, the coefficient for freedom 
slightly misses the 5% threshold of significance. Hence, a subsequent study on causal effects between 
freedom and equality should probably focus more on socio-economic than on political equality.
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